

Introduction to Mathematics for AI

Bayesian Estimation

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May 28, 2020

Outline

1 Introduction

- Likelihood Principle
 - Example, Testing Fairness
 - Independence from Influence
- Sufficiency
 - Fisher-Neyman Characterization
 - Example
- Sufficiency Principle
- Conditional Perspective
 - Example
- Sins of Being non-Bayesian

2 Bayesian Inference

- Introduction
- Connection with Sufficient Statistics
- Generalized Maximum Likelihood Estimator
- The Maximum A Posteriori (MAP)
 - Maximum Likelihood Vs Maximum A Posteriori
- Properties of the MAP

3 Loss, Posterior Risk, Bayes Action

- Bayes Principle in the Frequentist Decision Theoretic Setup
- Examples of Loss Functions
- Bayesian Expected Loss Principle
 - Example
- The Empirical Risk
- The Fubini's Theorem



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The Basis of Bayesian Inference

A Basic setup

- Let $f(x|\theta)$ be a conditional distribution for X given the unknown parameter θ .

For this observed data $X=x$, the function $f(x|\theta)$ is

- It is called the likelihood function!!!

The name likelihood implies that given x , this value of θ

- It is more likely to be the true parameter than θ' , if

$$f(x|\theta) > f(x|\theta')$$



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We are talking about optimization functions

- Where optimal's are being looked upon...

Definition

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Likelihood Principle

Remarks

- In the inference about θ , after x is observed, **all relevant experimental information is contained in the likelihood function** for the observed x .

There is an interesting example quoted by Lindley and Phillips in 1976 [1].

- Originally by Leonard Savage

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Something Notable

- The likelihood principle was first identified by that name in print in 1962 (Barnard et al., Birnbaum, and Savage et al.),

However, Fisher

- It was already using a version of it in 1920's.

However, versions of it can be traced to

- To the mid-1700s
 - ▶ It seems to have become a commonplace among natural philosophers that problems of observational error were susceptible to mathematical description.



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Testing Fairness

Basic Setup

- Suppose we are interested in testing θ , the unknown probability of heads for possibly biased coin.

Suppose the following Hypothesis

$$H_0 : \theta = 1/2 \text{ v.s. } H_1 : \theta > 1/2$$

Then

- An experiment is conducted and 9 heads and 3 tails are observed.
 - ▶ Not enough information to fully specify $f(x|\theta)$



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Scenario 1

Based on rashomonian analysis

- The classic Akira Kurosawa film *Rashomon* has become a shorthand for the lie of objective truth—what you see, basically, depends on where you stand.

Number of flips $n = 12$ is predetermined

- Then number of heads X is binomial $\mathcal{B}(n, \theta)$, with probability mass function:

$$P_{\theta}(X = x) = f(x|\theta) = \binom{n}{x} \theta^x (1 - \theta)^{n-x}$$



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Therefore

We have

$$P_{\theta}(X = x) = \binom{12}{9} \theta^9 (1 - \theta)^3$$

This

- We can use the *p* - value for testing the hypothesis.



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
- We can use the *p* – *value* for testing the hypothesis.



Then if we use the following p – value analysis

Definition [2, 3]

- The p -value is defined as the probability, under the null hypothesis H_0 about the unknown distribution F of the random variable X .



Therefore

For a frequentist, the p - *value* of the test is

$$P(X \geq 9|H_0) = \sum_{x=9}^{12} \binom{12}{x} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^x \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{12-x} = 0.073$$

Given $\alpha = 0.05$

- Then, H_0 is not rejected...



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Scenario 2

Number of tails (successes) 3 is predetermined

- i.e, the flipping is continued until 3 tails are observed.

Then you have a Negative Binomial with r the number of failures

$$f(x|\theta) = \binom{k+r-1}{k-1} (1-\theta)^k \theta^r$$

Thus, we have

$$f(x|\theta) = \binom{3+9-1}{3-1} (1-\theta)^3 \theta^9 = 55 (1-\theta)^3 \theta^9$$



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In a similar way

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$$P(X \geq 9|H_0) = \sum_{x=9}^{\infty} \binom{3+x-1}{3-1} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^x \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^3 = 0.0327$$

Thus, the hypothesis H_0 is rejected

- But this change in decision is not caused by observations.

However, all relevant information is in the likelihood!

$$\ell(\theta) \propto \theta^9 (1-\theta)^3$$



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Remark

Edwards, Lindman, and Savage remarked

- The likelihood principle emphasized in Bayesian statistics implies, among other things, that the rules governing when data collection stops are irrelevant to data interpretation.

Therefore

- It is entirely appropriate to collect data until a point has been proven or disproven, or until the data collector runs out of time, money, or patience.



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Thus

Likelihood Principle [4]

- The Likelihood principle (LP) asserts that for inference on an unknown quantity θ , all of the evidence from any observation $X = x$ with distribution $X \sim f(x|\theta)$ lies in the likelihood function

$$L(\theta|x) \propto f(x|\theta), \theta \in \Theta$$



Thus

Something Notable

- The interpretation of LP hinges on the rather subtle point of allowing any observable X to draw conclusions about θ .

Therefore

- If there two ways to gather information about θ , wither $X \sim f(x|\theta)$ or with $Y \sim g(y|\theta)$
 - ▶ with $X = x$ and $Y = y$ then

$$L(\theta|x) = \eta \times L(\theta|y), \forall \theta \in \Theta$$



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In the case of Learning

Yes, we use the principle, but we add the idea of independence

- A trick to assume a set of samples x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N such that $x_i \sim f(X|\theta)$

Then, as we have seen:

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta) = f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N | \theta) = \prod_{i=1}^N f(x_i | \theta)$$



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
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Example, $p(\mathbf{x}|\omega_j) \sim N(\boldsymbol{\mu}_j, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_j)$

$$L(\boldsymbol{\theta}_j) = \log \prod_{j=1}^n p(\mathbf{x}_j|\boldsymbol{\theta}_j)$$



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Sufficiency Principle

- An **statistic** is sufficient with respect to a statistical model and its associated unknown parameter if
 - ▶ "no other statistic that can be calculated from the same sample provides any additional information as to the value of the parameter"[5]

However, not always

- We want a definition to build upon it... as always



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A Basic Definition

Definition

- A statistic $t = T(X)$ is sufficient for underlying parameter θ precisely if the conditional probability distribution of the data X , given the statistic $t = T(X)$, does not depend on the parameter θ [6].

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- This agreement is non-philosophical, it is rather a consequence of mathematics (measure theoretic considerations).



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Fisher's Factorization Theorem

Theorem

- Let $f(x|\theta)$ be the density or mass function for the random vector x , parametrized by the vector θ . The statistic $t = T(x)$ is sufficient for θ if and only if there exist functions $a(x)$ (not depending on θ) and $b(t|\theta)$ such that

$$f(x|\theta) = a(x) b(t, \theta)$$

for all possible values of x .



Proof

First \Rightarrow (We will look only to the discrete case [7])

- Suppose $t = T(x)$ is sufficient for θ . Then, by definition

$$f(x|\theta, T(x) = t) \text{ is independent of } \theta$$

Let $f(x, t|\theta)$ denote the joint density function or mass function for $(X, T(X))$.

- Observe $f(x|\theta) = f(x, t|\theta)$ then we have

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$$\begin{aligned} f(x|\theta) &= f(x, t|\theta) \\ &= f(x|\theta, t) f(t|\theta) \text{ Bayesian} \\ &= \underbrace{a(x) b(t, \theta)}_{f(x|t) f(t|\theta)} \text{ Independence} \end{aligned}$$

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Now, for the case \Leftarrow

Suppose the probability mass function for x can be written

$$f(x|\theta) = a(x)b(x|\theta) \text{ where } t = T(x)$$

The probability mass function for t is obtained by summing $f(x|\theta)$ over all x such that $T(x) = t$.

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$$\begin{aligned} f(t|\theta) &= \sum_{T(x)=t} f(x, t|\theta) \\ &= \sum_{T(x)=t} f(x|\theta) \leftarrow \text{independence over } t \\ &= \sum_{T(x)=t} a(x) b_\theta(x) \end{aligned}$$

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Therefore, we have that

The conditional mass function of x given t

$$\begin{aligned} f(x|\theta, t) &= \frac{f(x, t|\theta)}{f(t|\theta)} \\ &= \frac{f(x|\theta)}{f(t|\theta)} \\ &= \frac{a(x) b_{\theta}(x)}{\sum_{T(x)=t} a(x) b_{\theta}(x)} = \frac{a(x)}{\sum_{T(x)=t} a(x)} \end{aligned}$$

The last expression does not depend on θ .

- t is a sufficient statistic for θ .



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Using the Bernoulli Distribution

$x_n \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\theta)$ are i.d.d. $\forall n = 1, \dots, N$

$$\begin{aligned} f(x_1, \dots, x_N | \theta) &= \prod_{n=1}^N \theta^{x_n} (1 - \theta)^{1-x_n} \\ &= \theta^k (1 - \theta)^{N-k} \end{aligned}$$

- $k = \sum_{n=1}^N x_n$

Now, if we have the following distributions

$$a(x) = 1 \text{ and } b_{\theta}(k) = \theta^k (1 - \theta)^{N-k}$$



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- $k = \sum_{n=1}^N x_n$

Now, if we have the following choices

$$a(x) = 1 \text{ and } b_\theta(k) = \theta^k (1 - \theta)^{N-k}$$



Therefore

Then choosing

- $T(x_1, \dots, x_N) = \sum_{n=1}^N x_n = k$

By the Fisher-Neyman Factorization Theorem

- k is sufficient for θ



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Something Quite Interesting

The Fisher-Neyman factorization lemma states

- The likelihood can be represented as

$$\ell(\theta) = f(x|\theta) = a(x) b_{\theta}(T(x))$$



If the likelihood principle is adopted

All inference about θ should depend on sufficient statistics

$$\text{Since } \ell(\theta) \propto b_{\theta}(T(x))$$

Sufficiency Principle

- Let the two different observations x and y have the same values $T(x) = T(y)$, of a statistics sufficient for family $f(\cdot|\theta)$. Then the inferences about θ based on x and y should be the same.



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Conditional Perspective

We have that

- **Conditional perspective** concerns reporting data specific measures of accuracy.

In contrast to the frequentist approach

- Performance of statistical procedures are judged looking at the observed data.



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Example

Consider estimating θ in the model

$$P(X = \theta - 1|\theta) = P(X = \theta + 1|\theta) \text{ with } \theta \in \mathbb{R}$$

- on basis of two observations, X_1 and X_2 .

The procedure suggested is

$$\delta(X) = \begin{cases} \frac{X_1 + X_2}{2} & \text{if } X_1 \neq X_2 \\ X_1 - 1 & \text{if } X_1 = X_2 \end{cases}$$



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Therefore

To a frequentist, this procedure has confidence

- To a frequentist, this procedure has confidence of 75% for all θ , i.e., $P(\delta(X) = \theta) = 0.75$.

The conditionalist would report the confidence

- 100% if observed data in hand are different
- 50% if the observations coincide



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Then

Conditionality Principle

- If an experiment concerning the inference about θ is chosen from a collection of possible experiments, independently of θ , then any experiment not chosen is irrelevant to the inference.



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Not a good idea to integrate with respect to sample space

What?

- **A perfectly valid hypothesis can be rejected because the test failed to account for unlikely data that had not been observed...**



The Lindley Paradox

Suppose $\bar{y}|\theta \sim N\left(\theta, \frac{1}{n}\right)$

- We wish to test $H_0 : \theta = 0$ vs the two sided alternative.

Suppose a Bayesian puts the prior $P(\theta = 0) = P(\theta = M)$

- The $\frac{1}{2}$ is uniformly spread over the interval $[-M/2, M/2]$.

Suppose $y = (1, 1, 1, 1)$ and $\bar{y} = 1$ are observed

- So, $\sqrt{n\bar{y}} = 2$



The Lindley Paradox

Suppose $\bar{y}|\theta \sim N\left(\theta, \frac{1}{n}\right)$

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Suppose $\bar{y} = 0.00000$ and $y = 0.01$ are observed

- So, $\sqrt{n\bar{y}} = 2$



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Suppose $n = 40,000$ and $\bar{y} = 0.01$ are observed

- So, $\sqrt{n\bar{y}} = 2$



Therefore

Classical statistician

- She/he rejects H_0 at level $\alpha = 0.05$

Bayesian odds in favor of H_0 are 11:1

- We will look at this... no worries, but Bayesian Statistician will choose H_0



Therefore

Classical statistician

- She/he rejects H_0 at level $\alpha = 0.05$

Posterior odds in favor of H_0 are 11 if $M = 1$

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Using our likelihood

We have our function

$$\ell(\theta) = f(x|\theta)$$

- The parameter θ is supported by the parameter space Θ and considered a random variable.
 - ▶ The random variable θ has a distribution $\pi(\theta)$ that is called the prior.



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Not only that

We have the following

- We can play a hierarchy game

$\theta \sim \pi(\theta|\tau)$ where τ is called a hyperparameter

This gives us an idea about the marginals

$$m(x) = \int_{\Theta} f(x, \theta) = \int_{\Theta} f(x|\theta) \pi(\theta) d\theta$$



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What about the posterior?

We have the following

$$\begin{aligned} f(\theta|x) &= \frac{f(x, \theta)}{m(x)} \\ &= \frac{f(x|\theta) \pi(\theta)}{m(x)} \\ &= \frac{f(x|\theta) \pi(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} f(x|\theta) \pi(\theta) d\theta} \end{aligned}$$



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An interesting case

Suppose that the observations are coming from $N(\theta, \sigma_1^2)$

- Assume prior on θ is $N(\sigma_2, \sigma_2)$

Then, under this setup:

- the normal/normal model, the posterior is $f(\theta|X_1, \dots, X_n) = f(\theta|\bar{X})$



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The connection

Lemma

- Suppose the sufficient statistics $T = T(X_1, \dots, X_n)$ exist. Then $f(\theta|X_1, \dots, X_n) = f(\theta|T)$.



Proof

Factorization theorem for sufficient statistics is

$$f(x|\theta) = b_{\theta}(t) a(x)$$

where

- $t = T(x)$ and $a(x)$ do not depend on θ .



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Thus

$$\begin{aligned}\pi(\theta|x) &= \frac{f(x|\theta)\pi(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} f(x|\theta)\pi(\theta)d\theta} \\ &= \frac{b_{\theta}(t)a(x)\pi(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} b_{\theta}(t)a(x)\pi(\theta)d\theta} \\ &= \frac{b_{\theta}(t)\pi(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} b_{\theta}(t)\pi(\theta)d\theta}\end{aligned}$$



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Multiply and divide by $\phi(t)$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \frac{b_{\theta}(t) \pi(\theta) \phi(t)}{\int_{\Theta} b_{\theta}(t) \pi(\theta) \phi(t) d\theta} \\ &= \frac{b_{\theta}(t) \pi(\theta) \phi(t)}{\int_{\Theta} b_{\theta}(t) \pi(\theta) \phi(t) d\theta} \\ &= \frac{\pi(\theta) f(t|\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} \pi(\theta) f(t|\theta) d\theta} = \pi(\theta|t) \end{aligned}$$



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Here, we have

The following equations

$$f(t|\theta) = \int_{x:T(x)=t} f(x|\theta) dx = \int_{x:T(x)=t} b_{\theta}(t) a(x) dx$$

Then

$$\int_{x:T(x)=t} b_{\theta}(t) a(x) dx = b_{\theta}(t) \int_{x:T(x)=t} a(x) dx = b_{\theta}(t) \phi(t)$$



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We have the following definition

Definition

- The statistics $T = T(X)$ is sufficient (in the Bayesian sense) if for any prior the resulting posterior satisfies

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This is equivalent to the classic definition of sufficient statistics

Theorem

- T is sufficient in the Bayesian sense if and only if it is sufficient in the usual sense.



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Something quite important

Something Notable

- The posterior is the ultimate experimental summary for a Bayesian.

Not only that

- The location measures (especially the mean) of the posterior are of importance.

There is an important idea

- The posterior mode and median are also Bayes estimators under different loss functions!!!



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Furthermore

Generalized Maximum Likelihood Estimator AKA MAP (Maximum A posteriori)

- The generalized MLE is the largest mode of the $\pi(\theta|x)$.



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What can we do?

We can specify a distribution

Then, learn the parameters

Remember the Bayesian Rule

$$p(\theta|\mathcal{X}) = \frac{p(\mathcal{X}|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(\mathcal{X})} \quad (1)$$

We seek that value for θ , called θ_{ML}

It allows to maximize the posterior $p(\theta|\mathcal{X})$



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It allows to maximize the posterior $p(\Theta|\mathcal{X})$



Therefore

We can use this idea of maximizing the posterior

To obtain the distribution through the Maximum a Posteriori



Cinvestav

Development of the solution

We look to maximize $\hat{\Theta}_{MAP}$

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\Theta}_{MAP} &= \underset{\Theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} p(\Theta|\mathcal{X}) \\ &= \underset{\Theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} \frac{p(\mathcal{X}|\Theta) p(\Theta)}{P(\mathcal{X})} \\ &\approx \underset{\Theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} p(\mathcal{X}|\Theta) p(\Theta) \\ &= \underset{\Theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} \prod_{x_i \in \mathcal{X}} p(x_i|\Theta) p(\Theta)\end{aligned}$$

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We can make this easier

Use logarithms

$$\hat{\Theta}_{MAP} = \underset{\Theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} \left[\sum_{x_i \in \mathcal{X}} \log p(x_i | \Theta) + \log p(\Theta) \right] \quad (2)$$



What Does the MAP Estimate Get?

Something Notable

The MAP estimate allows us to inject into the estimation calculation our prior beliefs regarding the parameters values in Θ .



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For example

Let's conduct N independent trials of the following Bernoulli experiment with q parameter:

- We will ask each individual we run into in the hallway whether they will vote PRI or PAN in the next presidential election.



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Where the values of x_i is either PRI or PAN.



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With probability q to vote PRI

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First the Maximum Likelihood Estimate

Samples

$$\mathcal{X} = \left\{ x_i = \begin{cases} PAN \\ PRI \end{cases} \quad i = 1, \dots, N \right\} \quad (3)$$

The log likelihood function

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$$\begin{aligned} \log p(\mathcal{X}|q) &= \sum_{i=1}^N \log p(x_i|q) \\ &= \sum_i \log p(x_i = PRI|q) + \dots \\ &\quad \sum_i \log p(x_i = PAN|1-q) \\ &= n_{PRI} \log(q) + (N - n_{PRI}) \log(1-q) \end{aligned}$$

Where n_{PRI} are the numbers of individuals who are planning to vote PRI this fall

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We use our classic tricks

By setting

$$\mathcal{L} = \log p(\mathcal{X}|q) \quad (4)$$

We have that

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial q} = 0 \quad (5)$$

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If we say that $N = 20$ and if 12 are going to vote PRI, we get $\hat{q}_{PRI} = 0.6$.



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Building the MAP estimate

Obviously we need a prior belief distribution

We have the following constraints:

- The prior for q must be zero outside the $[0, 1]$ interval.
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What prior distribution can we use?

We could use a Beta distribution being parametrized by two values α and β

$$p(q) = \frac{1}{B(\alpha, \beta)} q^{\alpha-1} (1-q)^{\beta-1}. \quad (8)$$

Where

We have $B(\alpha, \beta) = \frac{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(\beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha+\beta)}$ is the beta function where Γ is the generalization of the notion of factorial in the case of the real numbers.

Properties

When both the $\alpha, \beta > 0$ then the beta distribution has its mode (Maximum value) at

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We can choose $\alpha = \beta$ so the beta prior peaks at 0.5.

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We make the following choice $\alpha = \beta = 5$.

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We have a variance with $\alpha = \beta = 5$

$$\text{Var}(q) \approx 0.025$$

Thus, the standard deviation

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The log of $p(q)$

We have that

$$\log p(q) = (\alpha - 1) \log q + (\beta - 1) \log(1 - q) - \log B(\alpha, \beta) \quad (14)$$

Now taking the derivative with respect to q , we get

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Now

With $N = 20$ with $n_{PRI} = 12$ and $\alpha = \beta = 5$

$$\hat{q}_{MAP} = 0.571$$



Another Example

Let X_1, \dots, X_n given θ are Poisson $\mathcal{P}(\theta)$ with probability
 $f(x_i|\theta) = \frac{\theta^{x_i}}{x_i!} e^{-\theta}$

- Assume $\theta \sim \Gamma(\alpha, \beta)$ given by $\pi(\theta) \propto \theta^{\alpha-1} e^{-\beta\theta}$

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We can rewrite the mean as

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- Mean of MLE $\frac{\sum x_i}{n}$
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Something Notable

- The standard MLE maximizes $\pi(\theta|x)$, while the generalized MLE maximizes $\pi(\theta) \ell(\theta)$.
 - ▶ Quite funny we call that Maximum A posteriori (MAP) estimator!!!

The MAP estimator is since it is often simpler to calculate over that

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Properties

First

- **MAP** estimation “pulls” the estimate toward the prior.

Second

- The more focused our prior belief, the larger the pull toward the prior.

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- In the expression we derived for \hat{q}_{MAP} , the parameters α and β play a “smoothing” role vis-a-vis the measurement n_{PRI} .

Fourth

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Beyond simple derivation

In the previous technique

- We took an logarithm of the likelihood \times the prior to obtain a function that can be derived in order to obtain each of the parameters to be estimated.

What if we cannot derive?

- For example when we have something like $|\theta_i|$.

We can try the following

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Imagine an action space and $a \in \mathcal{A}$

For example

- In estimation problems, \mathcal{A} is the set of real numbers and a is a number, say $a = 2$ is adopted as an estimator of $\theta \in \Theta$.

Another one

- In testing problems, the action space is $\mathcal{A} = \{accept, reject\}$



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Everytime you make a decision you have a Loss

Actually

- Statisticians are pessimistic creatures that replaced nicely coined term utility to a more somber term loss!!!

How do we define such losses?

- A classic one $L(\theta, a)$
 - ▶ representing the payoff by a decision maker (statistician) if he takes any action $a \in \mathcal{A}$ in certina state of nature θ



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Examples

Squared Error Loss

$$L(\theta, a) = (\theta - a)^2$$

Absolute Loss

$$L(\theta, a) = |\theta - a|$$

0-1 Loss example

$$L(\theta, a) = I[|\theta - a| > m]$$



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Clearly the easiest mathematically SEL

Additionally, it is linked with

$$E_{X|\theta} [\theta - \delta (X)]^2 = Var (\delta (X)) + [bias (\delta (X))]^2$$

- Where $bias (\delta (X)) = E_{X|\theta} [\delta (X)] - \theta$



In another example

The median, m , of random variable X is defined as

$$P(X \geq m) \geq \frac{1}{2},$$

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Then

Using the following equivalence

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x} \left[\int_{f(x)}^{g(x)} \phi(x, t) dt \right] = \int_{f(x)}^{g(x)} \frac{\partial}{\partial x} \phi(x, t) dt + \phi(x, g(x)) \frac{\partial g(x)}{\partial x} - \dots \\ \phi(x, f(x)) \frac{\partial f(x)}{\partial x}$$

Then

$$\frac{\partial \varphi(a)}{\partial a} = - \int_a^\infty \pi(\theta|X) d\theta + 0 - 0 + \int_0^a \pi(\theta|X) d\theta + 0 - 0$$



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We have then

$$\frac{\partial \varphi(a)}{\partial a} = -P_{\theta|X}(\theta \geq a) + P_{\theta|X}(\theta \leq a) = 0$$

The value of a for which $\frac{\partial \varphi(a)}{\partial a} = 0$ is the median.

- Since $\frac{\partial^2 \varphi(a)}{\partial a^2} = 2\pi(a|X) > 0$ by the Fundamental theorem of calculus



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Finally

The Median Minimize

$$\varphi(a)$$



Cinvestav

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Bayesian Expected Loss

Definition

- Bayesian expected loss is the expectation of the loss function with respect to posterior measure,

$$\rho(a, \pi) = E_{\theta|X} [L(a, \theta)] = \int_{\Theta} L(\theta, a) \pi(\theta|x) d\theta$$

Here we have an important principle

- Referring to the less possible loss!!!



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The Expected Loss Principle

Definition

- In comparing two actions $a_1 = \delta_1(X)$ and $a_2 = \delta_2(X)$, after data X had been observed, preferred action is the one for which the posterior expected loss is smaller.

Therefore

- An action a^* that minimizes the posterior expected loss is called Bayes action.



The Expected Loss Principle

Definition

- In comparing two actions $a_1 = \delta_1(X)$ and $a_2 = \delta_2(X)$, after data X had been observed, preferred action is the one for which the posterior expected loss is smaller.

Therefore

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Example

If the loss is squared error

- The Bayes action a^* is found by minimizing

$$\varphi(a) = E_{\theta|X} (\theta - a)^2 = a^2 - 2E_{\theta|X} [\theta] a + E_{\theta|X} \theta^2$$

Then, we want $\varphi'(a) = 0$

- Solving for it, we have $a = E_{\theta|X} [\theta]$

Additionally,

- $\varphi''(a) < 0$ then $a^* = E_{\theta|X} [\theta]$ is a Bayesian Action.



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Given $X \in \{P_\theta, \theta \in \Theta\}$

A family which is indexed by a parameter (random variable) θ

- Here, we change our Bayesian hat to the frequentist one

This allows to make inferences about θ

- A solution is a decision procedure (decision rule) $\delta(x)$, that identifies particular inference for each value of x that can be observed.



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\mathcal{A} be the class of all possible realizations of $\delta(x)$, i.e. actions

The Loss function $L(\theta, a)$ maps $\Theta \times \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

- Defining a cost to the statistician when he takes the action a and the true value of the parameter is θ .

Then we can define a decision function called Risk:

$$R(\theta, \delta) = E_{X|\theta} [L(\theta|\delta(X))] = \int_{\mathcal{X}} L(\theta|\delta(X)) f(x|\theta) dx$$

- A frequentist risk on the performance of δ .



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Since the risk function is defined as an average loss with respect to a sample space

- it is called the frequentist risk.

Let \mathcal{D} be the collection of all measurable decision rules

- There are several ways for assigning the preference among the rules in \mathcal{D} .



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Furthermore

Some of them are

- The Minimax Principle
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Under the Bayes principle

Bayes risk

$$r(\pi, \delta) = \int R(\theta, \delta) \pi(d\theta) = E_{\theta} R(\theta, \delta)$$

where there is a δ_{π} called Bayes rule, minimizing the risk

$$\delta_{\pi} = \arg \inf_{\delta \in \mathcal{D}} r(\pi, \delta)$$

Bayes risk of the prior distribution π (Bayes envelope function) is

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Bayes Envelope Function Definition

Definition

- The Bayes Envelope is the maximal reward rate a player could achieve had he known in advance the relative frequencies of the other players.

In particular, we define the following function as

$$r(\pi, \delta) = E_{\theta} \left[E_{X|\theta} [L(\theta, \delta(X))] \right]$$

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
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Actually

A classic Bayes Rule

- The Naive Bayes Rules for classification using Gaussian's for classification



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The Fubini's Theorem (Informal Version)

Theorem

- Suppose X and Y are σ -finite measure spaces, and suppose that $X \times Y$ is given the product measure:

$$(\mu \times \nu)(E) = \inf \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \mu(A_j) \nu(B_j) \mid E \subset \bigcup_{j=1}^{\infty} A_j \times B_j \right\}$$

With any non-negative f measurable function f , then

$$\int_{X \times Y} f(x, y) d(\mu \times \nu)(x, y) = \int_Y \left(\int_X f(x, y) d\mu(x) \right) d\nu(y)$$



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Implications with the Expected Value

We have by the Fubini's Theorem

$$\begin{aligned}r(\pi, \delta) &= E_{\theta} \left[E_{X|\theta} [L(\theta, \delta(X))] \right] \\ &= E_X \left[E_{\theta|X} [L(\theta, \delta(X))] \right]\end{aligned}$$

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$r(\pi, \delta)$ is minimized for any fixed x

- When $\rho(\pi, \delta)$ is minimized, for any fixed x , $\delta_B(x) = a^*(x)$ where $*$ represent the optimal action.

Basically

- This result links the conditional Bayesian and decision theoretic frequentist inference:
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What happens when we have the Squared Loss?

The Bayes rule is the posterior expectation

$$\delta_B(x) = \frac{\int_{\Theta} \theta f(x|\theta) \pi(\theta) d\theta}{\int_{\Theta} f(x|\theta) \pi(\theta) d\theta}$$

Not only that, in the case of

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According to a Bayes principle

- A rule $\delta_1(X)$ is preferred to $\delta_2(X)$ if $r(\pi, \delta_1) < r(\pi, \delta_2)$

The frequentist uses Bayes principle

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Analysis of frequentist risk

It leads to various concepts as


- 1 minimaxity,
- 2 admissibility,
- 3 unbiasedness,
- 4 equivariance,
- 5 etc.







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